University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Anthropology Faculty Publications

Department of Anthropology

2-1-2011

The Symbolic Power Of Color: Constructions Of
Race, Skin-Color, And Identity In Brazil
Marcia Mikulak
University of North Dakota, marcia.mikulak@und.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/anth-fac
Part of the Anthropology Commons
Recommended Citation
Mikulak, Marcia, "The Symbolic Power Of Color: Constructions Of Race, Skin-Color, And Identity In Brazil" (2011). Anthropology
Faculty Publications. 5.
https://commons.und.edu/anth-fac/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Anthropology at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

THE SYMBOLIC POWER OF COLOR:
CONSTRUCTIONS OF RACE, SKIN-COLOR,
AND IDENTITY IN BRAZIL
Marcia L. Mikulak
University of North Dakota
ABSTRACT
Some current cultural anthropologists define race as a social construct, yet
explorations of the socio-historical constructions that give form and structure to
racial identities perpetuating notions of “race” are rarely discussed. This study
explores the theory of racial formations proposed by Michael Omi and Howard
Winant as it applies to Brazil’s racial project, arguing that Brazil’s rhetoric on
race and national identity during the late 19th to early 20th century culminated
in a racial project ultimately known as democracia racial. As a result, I propose
that Brazilian racial consciousness is symbolically pluralistic, encompassing
race, social class, and social position, generating a particularly virulent, yet
silent form of racism. I expand upon racial formation theory through analysis of
my fieldwork carried out in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerias, in 2004. This
analysis illustrates how contemporary Brazilian social structure and daily
cultural discourses on race, skin-color, racial identity, and social
marginalization reflect the nation’s early racist ideology, yet contest its reality.
Informants discuss self-identifications of skin-color, the meanings attributed to
color tonalities, and the impact racism has on their daily lives.

REFLEXIVE STATEMENT
For the majority of my childhood and adolescent years, I lived near Sacramento,
California, growing up in a military family; however, between the ages of three
and seven, my father was stationed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil during the Getulio
Vargas era in the early to mid-1950s. The four years that I spent in Brazil not
only made a strong impression on me, but also provided me with a life-long
connection to Brazil, the people, and the Portuguese language. As an
undergraduate student during the late 1960s and 1970s, I had strong
relationships with a variety of impressive African American jazz musicians in the
San Francisco Bay Area, and one of my first strong romantic relationships was
with a Black musician. My memories of the civil rights movement and of the
treatment that I received as a young white women in a relationship with a Black
man has remained with me, and has led me to question the root causes of racism,
inequality, and violence in mid-to late 20th century America. During my doctoral
research in anthropology in Brazil with street and working youth, I was once
again in Rio de Janeiro (1998 to 2000) where I became aware of the “racial”
demographics that describe the majority of street and working youth. The
prevalence of darker-skinned Afro-Brazilian children and youth who work the
streets of Brazil’s metropolitan areas struck me as significant, and I wondered
why so little social science research had focused on racial issues in Brazil. Since
my field work continues to explore the intersections between human rights,
racism, violence, and identity, this article grew out of my doctoral research with

darker-skinned Afro-Brazilian youth in Minas Gerais, Brazil.
“The Negro1 brings everything related to poverty, to being a servant,
– because the idea of being Negro is the question of being a servant,
a subordinate. What is the image of the Negro? A beast-of-burden.
Who will ever be proud of being a beast-of-burden? I mean, the
Brazilian consciousness about who the Negro is, is really what
needs to be changed” (State School Professora, 2004).
The above quotation demonstrates the frustration and anger expressed by an
Afro-Brazilian state school professor during a focus group discussion that
I conducted on “race”2 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in 2004. Her words exemplify
the sentiments held by many who experience racial discrimination in Brazil.
Such sentiments frequently remain within the private realm of personal
experience and private discourse. While numerous social science texts have
been published that disparage Brazil’s democracia racial,3 this myth continues
to persist (Burdick 1998; Hanchard 1994, 1999; Lovell 2000; Marx 1998;
Reichmann 1999; Sansone 2003 Schwarcz 1999; Skidmore 1995;Telles
2004;Twine 1998). A complex socio-historical “racial” paradigm continues to
inform Brazilian national social policies and popular public discourses about
skin color and biological phenotypes. Ninteenth century scientific notions of
race as a biological reality used to classify human populations into categories and
evolutionary hierarchies are no longer credible. However, popular (folk)
discourses that attribute race to skin-color, phenotypical appearances, and social
hierarchies continue to direct race relations in Brazil. This paper is a
compendium of socio-historical evidence and current ethnographic data that I
collected in 2004 on how the Brazilian racial project of democracia racial is
reflected, reproduced, and challenged in the everyday discourse of Brazilians.
As a doctoral student in anthropology who conducted research with streetandworking children in Rio de Janeiro and in Curvelo, Minas Gerais, (from
1998 to 2000), and again in 2004, I became aware of the effects of “race” on my
research participants and Brazilian friends. My field-notes and observations
recorded evidence of racial discrimination that were based on both skin-color
and phenotypical appearances. For example, the stereotypes and common
Brazilian Portuguese terms (moleque, trombadinha, and pivete4) that are used to
define street children are pejorative (Stephens 1999; Mikulak 2002). When
asking the children with whom I worked (96 percent of whom were darkerskinned
phenotypical Afro-Brazilians) if they could explain what racism is, they
defined it as being treated in ways that robbed them of their rights (to have a
home, food, a family, an education, and to be treated fairly). Yet, when these
same children were asked if they experienced racism, they could not identify
personal experiences with racism, and would usually respond that, “Brazil
doesn’t have racism; that happens in America!” or, “In Brazil, we’re a mixture of
everything, so there’s no racism here!” Many of these children lacked basic
health care, were often undernourished, and most worked on the streets in the
informal market before or after school, and some did not attend school due to
their economic need to work (Mikulak 2002).
Anthropologist Robin Sheriff (2000) argues that social scientists have focused
on the “loud places of history,” assuming that public discourses about everyday

life reveal topics of importance. According to Sheriff, it is about that which we
do not speak that is both under-recognized and under-studied by anthropologists
and other social scientists: silence is socially experienced and culturally
codified, and requires tacitly shared understandings that result in unconscious
complicity (Sheriff 2000:114). Granted, such complicity does not necessarily
imply a lack of consciousness about discrimination based on race (or any other
identifier), but it does corral sentiments of anger and frustration into the realm of
forbidden topics for public discourse. Over time, my investigative questioning
of working children began to unravel the façade of democracia racial. When
discussing race, inequality, and marginalization with the parents of my child
informants, they felt at liberty to speak about their experiences of social
exclusion and racial discrimination (Mikulak 2007b). Socially silenced “places”
are the habitat in which hegemony thrives, successfully cloaking the oppressive
practices from all social groups living within its grasp, but nonetheless finding
purchase in individual and collective consciousness. Within the privacy of their
home or in a casual discussion with close friends are the settings where the myth
of democracia racial is candidly challenged.
In 2004, I returned to Brazil to study the symbolic meanings of skin-color
terms and racial discrimination. Again, my data from focus groups and through
daily conversations with research participants confirmed the practice of everyday
silent racism, and supported Sheriff’s findings. The lack of public discourse
about “race” and racism in educational institutions and public media outlets is a
cultural practice that assists in ensuring the collective compliance to a powerfully
constructed Brazilian identity: the belief and practice of democracia racial.
Carefully crafted by the Brazilian “elites” after the abolition of slavery, the myth
of democracia racial assures that the origins of embedded negative stereotypes
remain both elusive and silent. In addition, my research data also confirm that
my informants are aware of the myth of democracy racial, and contest its reality
in private discourses.
My research data suggest that social groups (those that are based on race,
gender, age, or socio-economic status) interact within the hegemony of culturally
sanctioned silences in different ways, producing subtle ideological complexities
that assist in perpetuating racial social norms and maintaining cultural silences
about racial discrimination. For example, the working poor often blame
themselves for their poverty; poor, darker-skinned, racially stigmatized working
children argue the need to support their parents and to be “parents” to their
younger siblings, while justifying the discrepancies of obvious social, racial, and
class inequalities. Brazil’s African descendants publicly deny, yet privately
acknowledge, their own evidence of discrimination, while enduring social
marginalization and exclusion. Protected by walls topped with embedded broken
glass, “elites” (wealthy families, landed elites, and nouveau-riche) reside in
communities that evade the existence of racism while supporting
institutionalized practices of racial exclusion. These “elites” explain their fears
of favelados5 and marginals in terms of social class and educational differences,
effectively denying the daily reality of racism in their communities. Brazil’s
wide range of skin-color designations allows individuals to self-select their color
identities based on location, context, gender, and social class, providing evasive
strategies that partially mitigate the impact of racism, and in turn assist in
perpetuating the myth of democracia racial.

Institutional and social racism can, in part, be traced to the late 19th century
national project of miscegenation and racial mixture known as democracia
racial. The constructed ideology of democracia racial is not only embedded in
patterns of social relations, but also in the practices of market economies,
imbalanced educational systems, and exclusionary health care services. Current
forms of racism and social inequality exist in modified but equally disturbing
forms, and each was born from a definite political, historical, and economic
context linked to the project of constructing a new Brazilian identity (Leal 1977;
UNICEF 2004).

RACIAL FORMATION THEORY AND THE CULTURAL PRACTICE OF
RACISM
Omi and Winant (1994) outline a theory of race and racism that provides the
basis for analysis of the symbolic power6 of historical racism in the lives of
favela residents and university professors in this study. Omi and Winant argue
that race is a complex of social meanings about the differences inherently found
across human bodies. They argue that, while human physical characteristics
(phenotypes) are biologically based, selection of these traits for use by social
groups for racial identification is always socially and historically constructed.
Since a biological basis for distinguishing visible human racial groups does not
exist, and as anthropologist and human geneticist Alan Tempelton argues, “…the
existence of human races cannot be demonstrated by using [the] quantitative
threshold definition of race” (Goodman, Heath and Lindee 2003:240), it
becomes necessary to understand how the concept of race continues to shape and
structure social and cultural world views.
In addition, Omi and Winant argue that in order to understand the power that
current prejudice and discrimination have on individual and collective
consciousness, perceptions about “race” must be examined in relationship to
historical, geo-political, and socio-cultural patterns (Omi and Winant 1994). The
unique socio-historical processes that formed racial categories, and the
institutions and governmental programs that absorbed, directed, and
implemented racial practices, are key to understanding how race, social class,
and discrimination have been expressed in Brazil. Currently, the same historical
processes that produced Brazil’s racial project continue in modified forms, thus
perpetuating “…one of the world's most unequal distributions of income”
(Skidmore 2004:133). The causes of Brazil’s income inequality include cultural,
racial, political, and economic factors that have remained resistant to democratic
projects attempting to achieve a modicum of equality (Skidmore 2004). The
conditions that created racialized identities and social inequalities are social
productions that Marx stated long ago, and Brazilian Nunes Leal articulated in
his critique of representative government in Brazil, “The conditions of
production are at the same time the conditions of reproduction” (Marx 1977:711;
Leal 1977). Social actors are engines of both production and reproduction, and
as such are the only possible means for the reversal of "racialized social systems”
(Weyland 2008).
Presented next is a brief discussion on race from a social science perspective,
and a detailed discussion of the historical construction of Brazilian national

racial identity. My ethnographic data demonstrate some of the ways in which
racism in Brazil currently functions at both the macro and micro levels of
everyday life, and is a legacy of the historical constructions of Brazil’s racial
project, democracia racial.

SOCIAL SCIENCE, RACE, AND BRAZILIAN RACIAL DEMOCRACY
In 1998, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) adopted a draft
statement on “race,” declaring the concept of “race” as a cultural construct that,
…evolved as a worldview, a body of prejudgments that distorts our
ideas about human differences and group behavior… [fusing] myths
[about] human behavior and physical features together in the public
mind. Such myths bear no relationship to the reality of human
capabilities or behavior (AAA 1998).
While the AAA’s statement on “race” conflates biological criterion for race
into the paradigm of culture and ethnicity7, it does little to explain the meaning
of race, its role in socio-cultural contexts, or the forces that cause and perpetuate
it. Within the past 15 years, social scientists have been relatively silent on the
topic of racial discrimination in Brazil and have done little to expose its historical
origins. Since then, many social scientists (anthropologists and sociologists)
have focused attention on Brazil’s democracia racial. Thomas Skidmore’s
classic, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought,
demonstrated how the elite Brazilian intelligentsia developed misconceptions
about race throughout the Old Republic, based upon notions of positivist white
superiority embedded in social science theories (Skidmore 1995). Other scholars
such as Twine (1998), Reichmann (1999), Burdick (1998), and Sheriff (2000),
have provided important evidence of racism as experienced by Afro-Brazilians
living within democracia racial.
Twine analyzes everyday discourses and practices of Afro-Brazilians that
sustain and naturalize white supremacy, while Reichmann exposes the structural
components of contemporary racial dynamics and the economic, educational,
and social impact of these on Afro-Brazilians. The efforts of the movimento
Negro activists are explored by Burdick, whose work examines racism in tandem
with popular religion, Afro-Brazilian activism, the Brazilian nation-state’s
resistance to activism, and the cultural politics of gender. Sheriff’s work plumbed
the depths of Afro-Brazilian consciousness and explored domains of cultural
silences among Brazilian favaledos in Rio de Janeiro; her work ethnographically
demonstrates the reality of everyday racism experienced by Afro-Brazilians. My
own work with Brazilian street-and-working children (the majority of whom are
darker-skinned African descendents) demonstrates how poverty, racism, and
cultural constructions of childhood impact many children of color (Mikulak
2002; Mikulak 2007a; Mikulak 2007b).
Over the past 15 to 20 years, several government agencies have compiled data
on social, economic, and educational categories across ethnic and gender lines,
thus providing more reliable information on racial inequalities from which a new
body of literature on Brazilian racism has emerged. According to sociologist
Marcelo Paixão at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, such data has

contributed to the deconstruction of the myth of democracia racial, resulting in
an ever-increasing amount of Brazilian social science data on racial inequality
(Paixão 2004:744).8
In spite of the growing evidence of racism in Brazil, few social scientists have
explored the embedded racial meanings associated with skin-color. In Brazil,
skin-color identification systems are seemingly embodied representations of 19th
century racist “scientific” notions about Africa and her people. Such “scientific
notions” supported the agenda of Manifest Destiny and guided the Western
world’s policies on colonization, slavery, and modernization, crafting deep social
and cultural beliefs about racial and ethnic identity that have become part of the
structure of everyday life in Brazil (Rodriguez 1992; Segato 1998; Sheriff 1997).
These structural influences exist in regional linguistic racial and ethnic
stereotypes of people that include such terms as caboclos, sertanejos, and
caipiras.9 Currently, Brazilian structural social inequality is broadly defined by
the continued perpetuation of stereotypes developed by 19th century European
scientific notions of racial categories that reflect democracia racial through the
use of skin color terms, regional demographics, and phenotypical descriptors of
personal physical attributes.
Robin Wright, at the Universidade Estadual de Campinas, critiques Ribeiro
(1922 − 1997) who is considered by some Brazilianists to be Brazil’s “father of
anthropology”:
…Ribeiro presents his paradoxical vision of Brazil as a
“homogeneous and unified” people, yet [Brazil is] a house of cards,
a barrel of gunpowder riddled with internal social contradictions and
explosive racial and social tensions which, in fact, are becoming
ever more evident as time goes on (Wright 2002:703).
Ribeiro (who was Minister of Education under President Goulart, and held a
variety of other educational and political posts) was an influential Brazilian
anthropologist, author, and politician whose notions of Latin American identity
as homogeneous, uni-ethnic, and unified perpetuated Brazil’s myth of a
democracy racial. Ribeiro’s historical account of the evolution of the
“Brazilian” people is based on notions of cultural evolution whose roots spring
from the late 19th century pseudo-science of Social Darwinism (Ribeiro 2000).
The tensions described by Wright demonstrate the power that politicians such as
Ribeiro can use to reinforce national histories that attempt to create false notions
of racial uniformity. While Ribeiro sought to understand the racial tensions,
complexities, and contradictions within Brazilian society, he also perpetuated
national ideologies of ethnic unity that further solidified the racial tensions he
sought to understand.
Anthropologist Carole Nagengast argues that the crisis of the contemporary
nation-state lies in their ability to create and maintain a consensus among its
citizens “…about what is and what is not legitimate. When consensus fails,
ethnic or political opposition, which is otherwise suppressed or subtle, becomes
overt; the state, of course, cannot allow this to happen” (Nagengast 1994: 109110). Brazil’s racial project exemplifies the force and longevity of the power of
the nation-state’s role in the creation of democracia racial, where attempts at

“Black is Beautiful” movements were deemed “un-Brazilian;” Skidmore notes
the movement itself was “…branded by many whites as a foreign import”
(Skidmore 1983:108). Some social scientists argue that such denials of the Black
Movement illustrate the degree to which Brazilian Blacks are culturally alienated
(Fontaine 1985; Hale 1997; Healey 2003). “Black is Beautiful” movements in
Brazil have struggled mightily to politicize the use of the term Negro as a
positive indicator of Black Pride with little success (Baran 2007).
Strategies to deny the legitimacy of “black pride” social movements in Brazil
have succeeded for several reasons:
• The myth of democracia racial effectively convinces Brazilians
of all phenotypes and color-tonalities that race is not an issue, and
many who experience racism deny its existence.
• Little national, state, and municipal attention via local media
outlets has been paid to racism as a social experience. Open
public discourse about the popular beliefs of what “race” is, and
how race has been historically constructed and reconstructed is
largely discouraged and ignored in Brazilian media and
educational textbooks.
• Individuals experiencing racism have little to no knowledge
and/or access to recourses to take action against racial
discrimination.
• National laws that legally define “racial” differences do not exist
(as in the U.S.’s "Jim Crow" or South Africa’s apartheid), and as
such, the experience and topic of racism is not “real” to Brazilians
of all colors and phenotypes.
Thus, for people to talk about and struggle against racial discrimination, they
must know that it exists, and be able to validate its existence through social
discourse and participation in local and national organizations that combat
racism.
While I emphasize that the denial of racism is a tool used by both oppressors
and the oppressed to maintain a racial status-quo (hegemony), I do not wish to
victimize the victims of racial discrimination. The nature and function of
hegemony is such that not only the “powerful” reinforce discourses about racism,
but also the racially oppressed often insist that they are not oppressed, frequently
denying experiences of discrimination in their lives (de Paula Souza 2005).
The works discussed above substantiate evidence of racism in Brazil, but few
bring together the historical antecedents of science, history, anthropology, and
ethnographic research under a single tome to examine the powerful effects that
historical, political, and cultural constructions of “race” have on contemporary
life in Brazil.

THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACIA RACIAL:
15TH TO 19TH CENTURIES
In the late 15th century, the epoch of European colonization brought about the
eventual integration of global economics. The practice of slavery and its brutal
exploitation of human labor provided fertile ground for the propagation and
exploitation of race, and the burgeoning scientific revolution, beginning in the

Enlightenment, added validity and justification for the subjugation of peoples-ofcolor
(Bonilla-Silva 1999; Skidmore 1995; Winant 2000).
The effects of 300 years of Portuguese colonization assured the continuation
of Brazil’s slave economy long after the end of the slave trade in 1850. As a
result of competing tensions between military and political elites and increasing
international disapproval of Brazil’s continued practice of slavery, abolition was
not achieved until 1888 (Skidmore 1999). Fearing that abolition of slavery, and
the social system of master-slave relations would cause the loss of personal
wealth and disrupt long-established hierarchical social structures imported from
Portugal’s patrimonial and “personalistic”10 (Skidmore 2004) social system,
Brazil’s “landed-elites” worked to preserve those master-slave relations, thus
molding a national identity that disguised structural racism with enduring
success (Skidmore 2004; Leal 1977; Prado 1966).11 During slavery, and after its
abolition, ideological discussions about Brazilian identity were influenced and
informed by imported 19th century science and Social Darwinist anthropological
thought “…offer[ing] scientific validation to proponents of racial hierarchies,”
supporting the denigration of people of color and the racial superiority of whites
(Baker 1998:3, 35). The paradox of democracia racial lies in a contradictory
premise: “…acceptan[ce] of the existence of innate human differences while
praising the practice of racial blending” (miscegenation) (Schwarcz 1999:16).
Changing the Negro and Indian into a “whiter” (mestiço) population required
justifying the continuation of miscegenation, blending not only skin-color, but
also colonial “master-slave” relations, post-colonial “scientific” paradigms about
race, and enforcing Brazil’s “personalistic” social system, even among its most
“peripheralized” citizens.
Near the end of the 19th century, Brazil’s political rhetoric about development
and progress promoted the need to construct a new identity for Brazil’s racially
mixed population. By the end of the 19th century, Brazil had largely accepted the
French sociology of de Gobineau's “On the Inequality of the Races,” and
Moreau's “Treaties on Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Degenerations,” where
Gobineau argued that “pure” conquering races (Western Europeans) degenerate
after reproducing offspring with “inferior” races (Indigenous and African
peoples), and Moreau defined degeneration as the hereditary transmission of
weak traits from inferior to superior races (de Gobineau 1856; Borges1993).
Due to the mixture of three “distinct races” (Portuguese, Indigenous, and
African, the latter two of which were viewed as degenerate), Brazil’s population
resulted in the miscegenated mulatto (mestiço), which created both the problem
and the solution in the construction of a new national identity. A solution to the
problem of Gobineau’s and Moreau’s theories of degeneration as a result of interracial
mixing was achieved by rejecting the fatalistic assumptions of their
theories and embracing instead the notion that racial mixing could elevate and
whiten the population (Skidmore 1995).
Historically, constructions about “race” in Brazil were primarily “biologized”
according to phenotypical differences (not on rigid descent rules, as in the United
States), thus rendering racial identification to be dependent on the meaning of
phenotypes (including skin-color tonalities), and secondarily, on socioeconomic
relations. While skin-color was initially important and viewed as a racial

signifier, it became secondary to physical appearance. In today’s Brazil, skincolor
tonalities can be “lightened.” Once an individual who previously identified
as “Negro” achieves some economic success and status, s/he can “re-invent”
her/himself as “brown” (de Carvalho et. al 2004). Brazil’s current colorization
of skin according to color gradients, social capital, and economic position is a
racist system that expands into all social spaces (Telles 1995; 2004). However,
while money and social status can have the effect of “whitening” someone, it is
difficult if not impossible for those persons on the “darkest” end of the skin-color
spectrum (who also possess certain “African” phenotypes) to achieve upward
social and economic mobility (Bonilla-Silva 2010: 181-198).

BRAZIL’S 20TH CENTURY COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL
PARADIGMS OF RACE
Due to its mestiço population, the Western world by 1900 viewed Brazil as a
“tropical slum.” Grappling with a declining labor force, an increased population
of freed slaves in need of paid labor, and the preservation of a caste system based
on colonial patron-client relations from the latifundistas landed-elite, those
crafting the “new” Brazil used the revisionist racist theories to support the
growing labor needs of the state and to legitimize the bourgeoning mestiço
population (Schwarcz 1999). Brazil opened its doors to white immigrants from
Italy and Germany, beginning the nation’s policy of “Whitening” the mestiço
population.
Four 19th century European racist social science theories (polygenesis,
monogenesis, classical cultural evolutionism, and social Darwinism)12
influenced Brazil’s 20th century political forums, and assisted in the construction
of racial theories about the uniquely Brazilian mestiço. A determinist perspective
about race and social evolution was combined with miscegenation into a
workable pseudo-scientific perspective that validated the Brazilian mestiço,
while maintaining the superiority of light-skinned Iberians from Portugal. By
equating social differences (wealthy vs. poor and educated vs. illiterate) with
racial variations (phenotypical appearances that include skin-color), and
declaring the extinction of the “pure” Indian or “pure” African, Brazil carved out
the new national identity of the Moreno/a and achieved domination over
indigenous peoples, freed slaves, and darker-skinned African peoples. Nina
Rodrigues (1862−1906), the first Brazilian researcher to study the African
influence on Brazilian society, argued that darker mestiços could only be allowed
to possess (by law) “attenuated responsibilities,” since their regressive racial
traits rendered them irresponsibly “childlike” (Rodrigues 1976). The mulatto or
moreno body was successfully transformed into the “real” Brazilian and those
with darker skin-colors and African phenotypes were hegemonically constructed
as perpetually marginalized and socially stigmatized (Gould 1996; Schwarcz
1999; Skidmore 1995).

STRUCTURAL INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
The new national identity used scientific notions of race to craft social policies
and apply them to medicine, education and religion in the hopes of leading Brazil
to new heights of civilization and modernization (Rizzini 1994:83-10; Schwarcz

1999:29-35). For example, identification of degenerate traits associated with
Afro-Brazilians often relied upon
…aesthetic criteria to evaluate individuals and peoples. Medical
analysis looked for signs ('stigmata') of degeneration in the face and
body of a patient: protruding jaws, beetling brows, dark skin colour.
Not all of these signs were inborn…The nineteenth-century sciences
of physiognomy and phrenology, though in decline, provided the
link between psychiatry, anthropology, and the visual arts. In
painting and caricature, ape-like or animal facial types became
conventional signs of social menace and bestial traits (Borges
1993:238).
Political rhetoric produced debates on and about inferior and superior races,
and theories of degeneracy were debated by politicians, doctors, and educators in
government chambers and halls of justice where social policies were crafted.
Institutions such as The Assistance Service to Minors (SAM, created in 1941),
and the National Foundation for the Welfare of Minors (FUNABEM, established
during the Military Regime in the early 1960s to replace SAM), drew from the
rhetoric of Western European pseudo-scientific doctrines of racial hierarchies.13
During Brazil’s transition to democracy in the mid-to-late 1980s, hundreds of
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were formed to uphold basic human
rights for the marginalized and economically poor. Nonetheless, extreme
poverty in Brazil and racial discrimination has remained resistant to the efforts
of those NGOs to mitigate Brazil’s extreme social, economic, and racial
inequality.
Brazil’s new identity resulted in the national policy of “whitening.” Western
European immigrants, particularly from Italy and Germany, were welcomed
because their paid labor was desired over that of blacks (pardos, pretos and
Negros), and their “whiteness” would, through the process of miscegenation,
result in building a lighter skinned mulatto population. The mulatto was decreed
to possess a stronger intellect, thus rescuing them from the denigration and
marginalization associated with black Africans, who continued to be constructed
as inferior and primitive (based upon European colonial social constructions
about the inferiority of phenotypes associated with African descendents)
(Skidmore 1995).

PEJORATIVE SCIENTIFIC CONSTRUCTIONS OF PHENOTYPICAL
TRAITS
According to some scholars, medieval perceptions of “blacks” were not
generally pejorative (Fernandez-Armesto 1987; Jahoda 1999; Tytler 1982);
however, as European (Portuguese) exploration moved southward, racial
antagonism spread, casting black Africans in crude terms that included ridiculing
their sexuality as well as their humanness. Jahoda’s work in psychology and
anthropology provides an intriguing analysis of how deeply rooted racial
perceptions associate blackness with darkness, evil, the devil, and all that is
primitive (Jahoda 1999:26-28). In my research, participants drew from highly
pejorative symbolic meanings of Afro-Brazilian phenotypical appearances and

skin-color tonalities when discussing racism in Brazil, reflecting Jahoda’s
analysis of embedded symbolic notions about African peoples.
With the intensification of colonial exploration along the coast of West Africa
in 1442, the first African slaves were brought back to Portugal (Jahoda 1999)
where they were commonly cast in pejorative terms. By the 19th century,
historians tended to contextualize black Africans in the following manner: “On
the continent of Africa was another race, savage in their natural state, which
would domesticate like animals” (Froude 1895:49-50). Other constructed
assumptions by early explorers and historians about African people included
observations of their lack of reason, dexterity, and refinement in arts and material
culture. Such assumptions, drawn from the medieval notion of the Great Chain
of Being (Lovejoy 1936), resulted in the scientific racism of Carl Linneaus,
Lamarckian evolutionary theories, and naturalists whose works hypothesized
biological comparisons between humans and apes, particularly in reference to
their ability to inter-breed. Even as late as 1826, naturalist Jules Virey stated:
One could presume that hairy savages are half-breeds of apes and
women…One knows nothing about what kind of love goes on in
these ancient forests, where the heat of the climate, the brutal life of
the inhabitants, the solitude and the delirium of passion, without
law, religion, morals, can lead to daring everything; and these
degraded beings, these monsters half-way between humans and
apes…will long remain unknown to us (Jahoda 1999:45-46).
In Races and Peoples (published in 1890), archeologist and ethnographer
Daniel Brinton argued that mental and physical characteristics were correlated
with racial differences, stating that the “African negro [is] midway between the
Orangutan and the European white…the African black…presents many
peculiarities which are termed ‘pithecoid’ or ape-like” (Brinton 1890:276-277).
While John Wesley Powell (who was a supporter and champion of Native
American peoples) distanced himself from strict evolutionists such as Brinton,
he supported theories of the racial superiority of whites. In an 1888 article
Powell stated:
The human race has been segregated from the tribes of beasts by the
gradual acquisition of these humanities, namely: by the invention of
arts; by the establishment of institutions; by the growth of
languages; by the formation of opinions and by the evolution of
reason…the road by which man has traveled away from purely
animal life must be very long; but this long way has its land-marks,
so that it can be divided into parts. There are stages of human
culture. The three grand stages have been denominated Savagery,
Barbarism, and Civilization (Powell 1888:8).
As mentioned above, influences from French historians and philosophers
include, but are not limited to, the writings of de Gobineau (1843−1859), who
argued for the “uncivilizability” of black and mixed-raced peoples, and Le Bon’s
(1894) argument for the existence of distinct species of humans based on
anatomical differences of skin color and cranium size.

Finally, Swiss naturalist Louis Agassiz who traveled in Brazil, had a profound
influence on the development of “scientific racism” in Europe and the Americas
and ultimately, Brazil. Agassiz was perhaps the ultimate polygenist of the 19th
century. In writing to his mother about his first actual contact with “Negroes” in
the United States, he stated:
As much as I try to feel pity at the sight of this degraded and
degenerate race…it is impossible for me to repress the feeling that
they are not of the same blood as us. Seeing their black faces with
their fat lips and their grimacing teeth, the wool on the heads, their
bent knees, their elongated hands, their large curved fingernails
and…the livid color of their palms…what unhappiness for the white
race to have tied its existence …to that of the negroes! (Menand
2001:112).
The impact of “scientific racism” on African and Indigenous Peoples
throughout the colonized Americas was profound, not only in terms of horrific
physical suffering, but also in terms of denigrating cultural constructions that
cast them as less than human. Such constructed ideologies, born during the rise
of European expansion into the Western Hemisphere, are embedded into the
socio-cultural fabric of Brazilian contemporary life. The development of the
African slave trade and the practice of the extermination of Indigenous Peoples
is as much a part of the silenced, yet tacitly accepted assumptions of the racial
inferiority of Africans and Indigenous Peoples as is the assumed consensus of the
superiority of Europeans as the most advanced “race” of humans.
An examination of current skin-color identification and demographic
information on poverty and illiteracy based on Brazilian census data follows;
then a discussion of my findings from focus groups and individual interviews
illustrates the link between current racial discrimination and the socio-historic
legacy of Western European 18th and 19th century pseudo-scientific racism to
Brazil’s racial project, democracia racial.

RACE AND BRAZILIAN CENSUS DATA
Outside of Africa, Brazil currently has the largest African-descendent population
with a non-white national demographic estimated to be between 45 percent to 70
percent, as well as possessing one of the most unequal economic distribution
systems in the world, with a Gini Coefficient (in February of 2009) of 57.1 (de
Campos Meirelles 2009).14 The 2002 Brazilian national census provided clear
evidence of profound racial inequality: For example, pretos (black) and morenos
(brown), 15 years and older, have more than twice the illiteracy rate of broncos
(whites), while functional illiteracy15 is greater among pretos and morenos than
in the white population (do Valle Silva, Nelson, and Hasenbalg 2000; World
Bank 2004: Amaral 2006). In 2004, the Economic and Social Council of
UNICEF stated that “Afro-descendent children are twice as likely [in Brazil] to
be out of school, with the average number of school years dropping from 4.2 for
white children, to 3.3 for afro-descendent children, to 2.5 for indigenous children
(UNICEF 2004:2).
Racial discrepancies are evident when comparing data on education levels:
Ninety-eight percent of professors (with a master’s degree or PhD) are white,

while 48 percent (or more) of the population is pardo or preto, but only 14
percent of university students are darker-skinned Afro-Brazilians (Ramos 2006;
Morley 2005). In addition, darker-skinned Afro-Brazilian descendents earn only
half as much as their white co-workers, while 21.8 percent of Negros are
classified as indigent, as compared to 8.4 percent of whites (de Paula Souza
2005:9). According to Paixão, disaggregated data for African descendants and
whites reveal the severity of racial inequality in Brazil compared to other
countries, including Africa. Paixão states, “The black population in Brazil is still
characterized by the absence of collective social rights and by the wide gap
separating its living standards from those of the Brazilian European descendant
population” (Paixão 2004:743).
A chronological review of Brazil’s national census data-collection methods on
race reveals clear inconsistencies: In the 1950s, census data on race were
collected on only four skin-color categories (black, white, yellow, and brown); in
1960, an additional category, “indigenous,” was added. Although the 1960
census was never fully published, two of the categories (brown and indigenous),
were collapsed into the category of brown (pardo). From 1970 to 1979 during
the Military Regime, race data were not included as a part of the national census.
In 1980, race was re-introduced into the census, using the five categories used in
1960 (de Carvalho et.al 2004:333).
While the census gathers data on four skin color terms and one indigenous
category, Brazilians have developed a plethora of additional skin-color
designations that are both context- and personal relationship-dependent.
Rothblatt’s (1998) study on the use of race-based addressee terms demonstrates
how important social context is when race is used in public conversation. She
argues that negatively valued linguistic terms (such as “negão” for blackness)
contain both hostile and endearing meanings, such that meaning is coded for
“degrees-of-intimacy.” While Rothblatt’s argument demonstrates the complexity
of the meanings of skin-color terms in relationship to social context, it does not
account for the use of negative, racially pejorative terms that have been
reconstructed as terms-of-endearment used by everyday Brazilians of all skincolor
tonalities.
Based on recent social science research about race in Brazil, the government,
in 2004 quietly issued an 87-page document, "Political Correctness and Human
Rights," which listed 96 words and phrases it hopes will eventually become
unacceptable. (Approximately 17 of those words and phrases refer to race). In
the May 17, 2005 issue of the Christian Science Monitor, Correspondent Andrew
Downie states that the assistant secretary for the government's Promotion of
Racial Equality, Douglas Souza suggests that "Racism in Brazil exists though
hidden interpersonal relationships…There are no racist laws, but there is a
culture of racism and the instruments of that racism here are words" (Downie
2005:1-2). Due to public disapproval, the government quickly retracted the
document which declared that such terms were offensive to some people while
leaders of Brazil’s Black Consciousness movement argued that the document
was necessary. Ivanir dos Santos, one of the most outspoken Black leaders in
Rio de Janeiro, stated: "One of the principal characteristics of Brazilian racism
is that we don't talk about it. Withdrawing it [the 2004 document] is a
mistake…People tried to disqualify [the document] because it touches on words

that are racist and that are used as a matter of course" (Downie 2005:1-2).
Similar to other public discourses about race, census data are contextdependent
and linked to the government’s unofficial policy of whitening. For
example, I refer again to the census data collected between 1950 and 1980, which
reveal a decrease of 38 percent in the preto (black) skin-color category, and an
increase of 34 percent in the pardo (brown) category. Researchers suggest that,
because these two percentages are relatively equal, this may be an indication of
persons who self-identified as preto in 1950 consciously “reclassifying”
themselves as pardo in 1980. A similar pattern was discovered for the national
census between 1980 and 1990 (de Carvalho et al. 2004; Winant 2000).
My data illustrate how colonial constructions about African phenotypes and
early 20th century national “whitening policies” continue to construct and define
(in a negative way) Afro-Brazilians as they self-identify along Brazil’s skin-color
spectrum.

METHODOLOGY: FOCUS GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW
DATA
In 2004, my field assistant, Clemenson Campos da Cunha, and I organized focus
groups that consisted of adolescents in public schools, adult favela residents
(favelados), and individual interviews with professors who serve in public and
private universities in Brazil’s third largest city, Belo Horizonte (IBGE 2007):
The 36 participants consisted of:
•

•
•

Three adolescent focus-groups: 25 participants total (14 females,
and 11 males, all with a median age of 13, were recruited by their
schools and registered with administrators; all participants were
public school students living in selected favelas with high levels
of poverty).
One adult favela focus-group: five participants (4 females and 1
male).
Individual interviews: six participants (3 female professors, and
3 male professors, representing both federal and private
universities).

All interviews were arranged by my field assistant; focus groups and
interviews were thematically organized to address the following questions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is race?
What are the skin-color terms that you use and hear other people
use?
What is your skin-color?
What is the meaning of your skin-color?
Why do you self-identify with this skin color?
What are your definitions of race?
What is your definition of racism?
How have you experienced racism?
How do you recognize racism?

•
•

What is the meaning of the term Negro?
What is the meaning of the term preto?

From darkest to lightest, skin-color identification terms were developed and
self-selected by focus group participants and by participants in individual
interviews (i.e., participants were not given a prepared list of racial terms from
which they could “choose” a skin color for themselves). As part of skin-color
terms, the symbolic meanings of those terms were also defined by focus group
participants and individual interviewees:
1. Preta: Black. A pejorative term, except for those few who were
politicized
2. Negra: Dark, dark brown or black with tonalities of brown; also
signifies phenotypes associated with African descent (indicating
ethnicity and dark skin color)
3. Parda: Very brown (verging on black), considered a pejorative
term, but preferred to the term preta
4. Morena Escura: Medium to dark brown
5. Mulatta: Dark tan to dark brown (a sexualized term – particularly
for women of dark to very dark skin color), considered a
pejorative term
6. Morena: Light brown
7. Morena Clara: Very light color
8. Clara: Light cream color
9. Branca: White

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Of the 25 adolescent participants, the most frequently self-selected skin color
was moreno/a (12 of 25, or 48% see Table 1), while the remaining eight other
skin-colors where relatively evenly self-selected (see Graph 1).
Graph 1: Adolescent Favela Focus Group by Skin Color and Gender

For the adult favela focus-group participants (four females and one male, n = 5),
two females self-identified as negra, one female self-identified as morena, one
female self-identified as clara, and the male self-identified with two terms,
negro-preto.

Interviews with university and school professors (three females and three
males, n = 6) identified only one skin-color tonality (moreno/a), with light and
dark “modifiers,” from the darkest to lightest colors: morena escura, morena,
and morena clara: four self-identified as moreno/a, one self-identified as
moreno-escuro, and one self-identified as morena-clara.
Table 1: All Participants by Skin-Color and Gender (n = 36)

Among all 36 participants, Negro was preferred over the term preto (11.1 percent
self-identified as Negro, and 2.8 percent self-identified as preto), while the terms
claro and bronco were chosen 2.8 percent and 5.6 percent of the time,
respectively. All skin color terms are presented in masculine form (see Table 1).

PRETO VS. NEGRO – INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS AND ADULT FOCUS
GROUP PARTICIPANTS
When adult favela focus group participants were asked if they preferred the term
preto or Negro, they frequently used both terms synonymously, yet when they
distinguished between them, their distinctions were based upon degrees of skin
color darkness. In other words, a dichotomous distinction between preto or
Negro was not a viable choice, since multiple color gradations are used to
mitigate the extremes between these two terms. For example, the following male
adult favelado (who self-identified as preto and Negro) stated:
…preto and Negro are the same words…only Negro is a moreno that
is a little lighter, but Negro and preto are the same thing… [but]
preto is a very pejorative term…so, if someone calls me preto, I say
that I’m not preto, I’m Negro.
In this example, the adult male favela resident, stated that the term preto is
seen as derogatory. The same participant also stated that if a close friend or
relative referred to him as pretinho (little black – an apelido or nickname), such
a term would not be offensive, depending upon whom is speaking, and the shared
understanding of the type of relationship existing between the addressee and the
addressor. This confirms Rothblatt’s work on address terms. When asked why
the term pretinho would not be offensive when used by a close friend or intimate,
he replied, “You know, a friend calls you a “pretinho,” or “negão"“ and it’s like
saying 'hey man, you’re dark, but it’s OK, I like you anyway.'” This explanation
implies that friendships can mitigate negative social stereotypes, and that
racialized apelidos provide a kind of social bond, at least for this participant.
Participants told me that referring to oneself as preto is generally understood
to be self-demeaning and brings with it social, cultural, and historical meanings

most Brazilian’s avoid unless the intent is to demean or otherwise inflict
emotional distress or signify a level of intimacy that inverts abusive terms into
acts of affection. For example, a Moreno male (the director of a public school
and a professor of mathematics), articulated metaphors of “preto-ness” in rather
strident terms, referring to preto as that which:
…is associated to bad things, to what may be forgotten – preto is
dirty – it’s different from saying Negro, you say 'preto' and you are
meaning something that is of little importance, that is pejorative,
less intelligent, poor, ugly – well, you know, the mouth, the nose, the
hair.
An adult Negra female favela resident said, “I think that preta is pejorative –
I think that 'preta' is too strong, because preta is really something preta – without
light, full of darkness.” A male moreno history professor from the Federal
University of Belo Horizonte presented this meaning of Negro:
Preto is the Negro color, right? Preto, preto – I think that in history,
in the language’s past – I think that the idea of darkness, of being
dark, everything that is dark reminds us of the idea of backwardness.
Hell is Negro – I think that we Brazilians have this misconception,
very disguised, very hidden, about the Negro being underdeveloped,
less intelligent.
A female morena professor from a state school who was quoted at the
beginning of this article expressed colonial connotations about the negative
meanings of dark skin:
…There are many reasons—the slavery period in Brazil, because of
what the Negro brings with him from such a time—a past of misery,
of suffering, of being chased, of being imprisoned—The Negro
brings everything related to poverty, to being a servant,—who will
ever be proud of poverty, of being caught, of being a
servant…because the idea of being Negro is the question of being a
servant, a subordinate. What is the image of the Negro? A beast-ofburden! Who will ever be proud of being a beast of burden? I mean,
the Brazilian consciousness about who the Negro is, is really what
needs to be changed.
Beliefs about the inferiority of darker to darkest skin-color terms and the
negative stigmas attached to them are evident in the statements of the above
participants who represent a spectrum of social positions, social class, and selfidentified
skin colors. Demographically, their perceptions and understandings
about the symbolic meanings attached to the use of the term preto are fairly
consistent and could imply uniformity about the racialized meanings of various
skin-color terms across socio-economic and other demographic lines.
While participants frequently conflated the term preto with the term Negro,
Negro was characterized as being less pejorative, but my informants seemed
conflicted by the use of the term. To them, the term Negro implies darker skincolor
tonalities along the skin-color spectrum that they use, but it is preferred

over the term preto when identifying as a darker-skinned Afro-Brazilian because
it is “lighter” than preto. Historically, Negro was the racial term used when
referring to African slaves (Baran 2007), and interestingly, my participants
referred to the term Negro as implying African ethnicity. My participants also
associated preto with the darkest of skin-color tonalities, which seemed to imply
a lack of racial mixture. In this sense, the term preto is an exclusionary term that
identifies an individual as being apart from the national identity of Moreno, as
constructed by Brazil’s racial project. This exclusionary nature of dichotomous
skin-color terms also helps explain why little popular resistance to Brazil’s
practice of racial discrimination exists and why Black Afro-Brazilian movements
have not increased in popularity.
One adult favela focus group participant stated, “If you say Negro, you’re
talking about the race, but if you say preto, that dark skinned hue, you’re
offending a lot more than if you say Negro.” However, another adult favela
participant argued that while Negro is preferable to the term preto, to be called
Negro is still offensive:
…It started with slavery, first enslaving the Indians and then
bringing in the Africans, the Negro, and this comes from generation
to generation, because when you say Negro it is an offense; it is
about a person that was thrown into society; it’s like falling from the
sky out of nowhere.
While the term Negro was the least offensive to the favelados, it signified a
“race” without a legitimate heritage of historical pride. To the Brazilian political
elites who crafted the racial project of democracia racial, the essence of Africa
as a continent and as peoples lacked historical legitimacy in terms of
enlightenment ideologies of progress and development. Brazil’s racial project of
miscegenation is embodied and expressed in many of my informants’ statements
as a sense of both shame about their racial past and inherited skin color, and
indignation at the continued expression of racial and social marginalization.
Because of the still-popular notion of democrica racial and a slow, but growing
awareness of racial inequality, many informants found our discussions on race,
skin-color, and racism to be difficult. At present, there is little recourse for
economically poor individuals who experience racism due to skin-color and/or
phonotypical stereotypes. While Brazil’s new constitution provides for legal
recourse, few individuals have access or the resources to take their cases to court.
Not surprisingly, moreno/a was the most often self-selected skin-color by all
participants (47.2 percent). Moreno/a is most commonly used since it is a
“neutral” term that refers to almost any combination of phonotypical features; it
refers to a blending of skin colors reflecting the nation-state’s racial project of
Brazilian identity: a continuum of light-brown to darker-brown skin color with
physical features that do not represent African phenotypes. A female favela
student was one of the few participants who self-identified as Negra. She spoke
of her understanding about the lack of racial consciousness in Brazil when she
stated, “In Brazil, there is no consciousness about racism – we are still extremely
backward in this – we don’t have a mature consciousness of what it is to be
Negro.” This participant was the only one who expressed pride in being Negra,
which she attributed to the mentorship of a teacher in her school.

EDUCATION, GENDER, JOB MARKET DISCRIMINATION
Along with the national policy of whitening, educational practices in Brazil
reflect the nation-state’s racial project of democracia racial in deep structural
ways, including the dichotomy of public vs. private primary and secondary
schools, and public vs. private universities. The use of the vestibular (university
entrance exam) effectively “filters-out” the economically poor who are most
often Afro-Brazilian public school students who apply to federal universities (the
best research schools), enrolling only those with high vestibular scores who can
afford specialized courses preparing them to take the exam.16 Racial tensions
within the market place and in educational settings were readily evident among
my informants (particularly among darker-skinned Afro-Brazilian females) when
we discussed gender and race.
My findings correspond to Sansone’s research on constructions of race,
ethnicity, and identity among young, poor, Afro-Brazilian youth in Bahia, who
demonstrated awareness that their prospects for employment in the formal
economy were slim to non-existent (Sansone 2003:35-37). Despite repeated
assertions of their belief in Brazil’s democracia racial, favela adolescents in my
study were also keenly aware that skin color and phenotypical attributes
adversely affect their prospects in the market place. Baran’s (2007) work in
Southern Bahia among adolescent high-school girls demonstrates how skin-color
terms are frequently manipulated by job applicants as they vied for jobs. In
Baran’s study, competing for jobs meant that women often worked diligently to
straighten their cabelo duro (hard or wiry hair), and usually spent up to one-third
of their monthly salaries in local salons in order to achieve a physical
transformation that would hopefully assist them in securing a job. Adolescents
in my focus groups also discussed the negatively constructed gendered
stereotypes attached to Afro-Brazilian females. A morena favela female
adolescent described the experience of a friend who was passed over for a
teaching job because she was perceived as a Negra:
And they looked at her from top to bottom and said she was Negra.
And then they picked the light-skinned girl, all blondish and pretty,
even though she didn’t have the same qualifications the Negra one
had, but they picked her because she was light-colored.
A branca female favela student described how both the media and the job
market negatively “profiles” dark-skinned women’s intellectual “disabilities”
stating, “The Negra woman – you never see a Negra woman doctor, all you see
is Negra janitor, Negra maids, Negra farm workers.” A Negra female professor
in a public school provided her personal experience of “racial profiling” in the
job market, referring to newspaper job application ads calling for “young women
with good looks.” When she and a “white” friend applied for the same job, the
Negra professor was passed over and told that “…Negras couldn’t work
there…when job advertisements say 'good looks,' they’re talking about your skin
color” and African phenotypes. The same women told me that such
advertisements were actually “codes” for saying, “no blacks need apply.”
A morena female adolescent described being taught negative stereotypes
about Africa and Negros in school:

We saw and learned that the Africans were the personification of
suffering, a people with no culture that can’t reach anywhere; they
never leave that place, always having the same lame life.
In discussing the history of economic and educational discrimination, a
morena female professor of sociology and director of a public school stated that
the current age at which poor children (usually of darker skin color) begin
working on the streets in today’s informal economy is between 7 to 8 years of
age (a legacy from slavery). She continued by clarifying how inferior
educational opportunities for Negros continue to be prevalent: “There isn’t a
single one [dark-skinned Afro-Brazilian] that isn’t a slave-descendent that has
not suffered from the issues of educational and economic racism.” Finally, a
moreno male director of a public school described educational racism this way:
Public education is awful and serves mostly Negros – we are
producing a large number of people that will never have real jobs –
Brazil is like India, with a caste system, the doctor’s son will
become a doctor, engineer, lawyer – and downward it goes.

SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF SKIN COLOR GRADIENTS
A Negra female student stated that the term preto implies a stain against basic
humanness in Brazil. “In the books that I have read – death is always associated
with preto [the color black], and it also brings a kind of disgrace with it.” This
student’s statement provides a good example of how racist 19th century
constructions of the Afro-Brazilian continue to function in everyday discourses.
Such symbolically constructed notions about Africa and the Negro in Brazil
demonstrate the power of symbolic meanings that craft everyday notions about
skin-color and African phenotypes; it is cognitive maps such as this that
perpetuate systems of social inequality, poverty, and racism in Brazil.
A Moreno male student defined the meaning of Negro as beginning with the
Portuguese:
…their enslavement of Indigenas and Negros, and that this memory
is passed from generation to generation, because when you say
Negro, it is an offense – it is about a person that was thrown into
society – it would be like me calling you sour milk. Society hasn’t
learned that skin color is one thing, but its meaning is something
altogether different.
According to one adolescent male, being Negro means not only knowing your
social location, but also it implies your social inferiority:
There are those [Negros] who despise their own color. We’ve
learned that if we put our finger on the fire, it will get burnt, and
after a while, you learn that, oh, I am of color and my place is here;
I won’t try to study or go to college or anything. I’ll be a nobody
because I am Negro and my place is down here.
Knowing one’s “própria posição social” (proper social position) also defines
one’s life possibilities, making it clear that no amount of effort will release you

from the stigma that the social constructions of racial phenotypes. Those most
impacted by racism also define their conceptions of self and others based on the
racial hierarchies that limit them. For example, another young male participant
(dark moreno) stated:
Negros and pretos discriminate against each other without even
knowing it. It’s interesting – the ideal woman – for men, you can
say that they don’t want that morena -skinned, that Negra little girl,
they’d rather have the blue-eyed European one, the preference is for
the most light-skinned ones, right?
Such narratives of racism demonstrate the effect of Brazil’s covert cultural
constructions of “race,” and reveal how Brazilians of African descent
contextualize and narrate their experiences, positioning themselves away from
preto on the skin-color spectrum.
In Dreaming Equality: Color, Race, and Racism in Urban Brazil, Sheriff
(2001) discusses the negative assumptions embedded in racial terms such as
preto and Negro that reflect a lack of social worth, physical aesthetics, and moral
stances. My findings reflect Sheriff’s statement, “Negro and similar
words…simultaneously connote darkness, ugliness, marginality, and
immorality…All terms are located, both symbolically and discursively, within a
hierarchy that posits both aesthetic and moral values. Negro and preto are at the
bottom of this hierarchy” (Sheriff 2001:49).
Based on discussions with my informants and Afro-Brazilian friends, the term
Negro is used in the cultural context of Brazilian Portuguese, and constitutes a
linguistic conundrum when translated into English. In English, the Brazilian
Portuguese term Negro, according to my informants, refers to ethnicity as well
as to skin-color tonality, with Negro implying dark to very dark skin, but not
“preto” (black) skin color. Therefore, for them, Negro refers to ethnicity both in
terms of African heritage and African phenotypes – from a darker to very dark
skin color that is lighter than a pure preto (black) skin tonality, and reflects that
some racial mixture (miscegenation) has occurred; conversely, preto refers to
black skin (no racial mixture) and to phenotypical African features, both of
which are the ultimate “signifiers-of-race” in Brazil.

CONCLUSIONS
Do these beliefs accurately represent how Brazilians think about skin color and
about their “racial” identity? If asked to agree or disagree, most Brazilians
would quickly disagree, and reply “Nós não temos racimo aqui em Brasil. Todo
mundo é uma mistura de toda aqui; português, indigena, Negro. América tem
racismo!” (We don’t have racism in Brazil. Everyone is a mixture of everything
here – of Portuguese, Indian, Negro. America has racism!). From early 2000
polls taken in Rio de Janeiro, 93 percent of the respondents stated that racism
exists in Brazil, but 87 percent of those respondents said that they were not racist,
thus frustrating Black activists who continue to fight the invisible enemy of
democracia racial (Buckley 2000). Brazil’s racial project continues to be passed
on through the historical imagination and national rhetoric about what it means
to be Brazilian, and what it means to be Afro-Brazilian. What is a Brazilian’s

color? It is mostly a mixture (mulatto), but it is seldom that Brazilian’s selfidentify
as preto or African.
How can racism in Brazil be transformed? Perhaps one way to approach this
question is by comparing racial transitions between the United States and Brazil.
Omi and Winant (1994) employ their theory of racial formations to the minority
movement of the 1950s and 1960s in the US. They argue that two important
changes were characteristic in US racial politics during these decades:
• A paradigm shift occurred in the constructed meanings of race
and racial identities, which led to the civil rights movement.
• The civil rights movement generated new black social
movements that contested the nature of racial politics (Omi and
Winant 1994:95-98).
I also contend that legalized racism became increasingly controversial in the
US after World War II, thus placing the country in an awkward position as
leaders in the creation of the United Nations (UN) and the drafting of the
Universal Deceleration of Human Rights (UDHR). The obvious nature of
legalized racism in the US provided a clear and present admission of racism in a
country that had been instrumental in drafting the UNDHR. The ideological
support for human rights and the contradiction of them in the US played a
significant role in the Civil Rights Movement. No such obvious contradictions
were recognized in Brazil, where the ideology of democracia racial alleged that
racial relations in Brazil were ideal (Frazier 1992; Freyre 1987).
Another difference between US and Brazilian racism is the lack of successful
and on-going Black Pride movements in Brazil. In his study of the Afro-Brazilian
activist movement, Hanchard (1994) asks why Black pride movements in Brazil
have not generated a similar civil rights movement. Sociologist France
Winddance Twine shares Hanchard’s curiosity about the failure of Afro-Brazilian
activists to create and sustain a Black pride movement such that the ideology of
democracia racial is denounced. Winddance Twine’s research explores the
question of race through “…the perspective of ordinary Brazilians who are not
engaged in antiracist activism…[instead of through the lenses of]…historians,
sociologists, and political scientists [who] have sought an answer to this paradox
by analyzing the elite…the state…or antiracist activists (1998:4-5). My research
draws upon her approach, and supports her findings by further illustrating how
everyday ordinary Afro-Brazilians think about, feel, and understand their
experiences of racism in Brazil’s democracia racial, while also addressing the
elite's construction of the state's policy of democracia racial.
Participants in my study were aware of the symbolic, metaphorical, and social
meanings connected to skin colors – especially darker tonalities. However, other
than general knowledge about Africa’s colonial subjugation and its subsequent
poverty, misery, and “backwardness,” my informants were unable to provide
stories or historical information about African history that invoked a sense of
pride in being African. The lack of popular discourses that valorize African
history (not simply candomblé, samba, and carnival) suggest a paucity of
African Studies educational programs in Brazilian primary and secondary
educational settings, as well as in Brazil’s institutions of higher learning. In
essence, Brazil’s racial project has been more subtle than in the US. Absorbing
African and Indigenous bodies into a constructed Brazilian identity that validated

Western European Enlightenment ideals effectively dissolved the possibility of
being Afro-Brazilian. The only viable embodied identity is that of the mulatto or
mestiço – whose skin-color and phenotypes reflect Western European aesthetics.
To Brazilian social scientists, racism is both palpable and visible, but is
successfully silenced in everyday public life. Popular discourses continue to
conceptualize poverty and inequality as a social class issue, yet statistics on
health, education, and employment bear out the serious inequities that exist
between preto, Negro, and lighter-skinned moreno Brazilians. A female history
professor argued that the inferiority of the darker-skinned Afro-Brazilian is
tacitly understood because of the pejorative constructions of African phenotypes
associated with slavery, and the lack of educational material and curriculums that
present non-colonial historical perspectives about Africa and her people: “…it is
necessary to remove this mystique of the inferiority of the Negro, of him being
less than others. As long as this impression lasts, Negros will be viewed as only
slaves.” As she implies, the socio-historical racial project in Brazil can be
mitigated by social actors identifying their socio-historical past and insisting on
re-claiming their stolen identities. Such individual actions can result in forms of
social action that refuse to accept the hegemony of everyday “common sense”
notions of the ways things are.
My informants’ stories reflect the material, temporal, and psychological costs
of being an individual with Afro-Brazilian phenotypical traits. Hair, lips, noses,
body shapes, and skin colors that reflect African descent are highly stigmatized
and even considered offensive, especially for Brazilian women (Baran
2007:388). Like Baran, I did not find these observations to be an anomalous,
since they were common among participants in my research. Of interest,
however, is the tension between the personal knowledge that racism exists, and
the continuation of the dominant popular discourse of democracia racial.
Data in this study reflect the racial consciousness of individuals living in Belo
Horizonte across class, age, race, and gender; these data demonstrate that
dialogues about racial discrimination and stereotypical perceptions about blacks
are consciously known, understood, and even accepted. Why, then, does the
myth of democracia racial persist? While the participants in my research are
keenly aware of racism in terms of its practices and codes, open public
discourses about the ways in which racism functions in Brazil have, until very
recently, not become part of classroom discussions or open public debate.
Individual experiences with racism are felt and acknowledged, yet repressed.
Participants stopped short of converting their feelings into complaints or social
activism because they had no faith that the law would provide them with justice.
When asked why they didn’t report racism in the job market, for example, the
most common reply was that nothing would come of their complaint; “laws stay
on the paper in Brazil,” or “laws function for those who don’t need them in
Brazil.”
To paraphrase Gramsci, hegemony requires the complicity of the oppressed to
secure and maintain the necessary social control the nation-state has over them
(Buttigieg 1992). While my informants realized that they were denied the same
opportunities available to non-racialized groups, their social status, and to some
extent, their racial identity has been expertly managed and maintained by the

hegemonic racial project initiated by the Brazilian nation-state after abolition.
Those who experience racism have little recourse and fewer resources with
which to transform their false-consciousness.
Brazil’s national identity and the ideologies that formed it are embedded in
systems of education, the media, religion, informal and formal market places,
and within everyday performances of both individual and collective identity.
While participants are either partially or largely aware of racism directed at them,
they are unable to mobilize their own indignation in ways that publically call
attention to their marginalization. In the 1950s, African Brazilian scholar and
activist, Abdias do Nascimento, stated that those who believe in Brazil’s racial
paradise:
do not perceive the subtle socio-psycho-logical theory that has been
intricately built and developed over the course of our history,
landing those who partake of it in a surrealist labyrinth. This has
retarded, but not eradicated, the spectacular emergence of prejudice
and its consequent counterpart, also spectacular, the militant
reaction of blacks (da Silva Martins, Medeiros, Nascimento
2004:788).
While I have argued that through the social processes of hegemony and false
consciousness, the oppressed foment their own oppression, I also argue that the
Brazilian racial project can be altered or even reversed when activist social
movements gain momentum through the efforts of individual and collective
actors in partnership with social institutions. Yet before Black Pride activist
movements and open public discourses about race can take root and spread in
Brazil, new ideological paradigms about racial identity need to be forged, such
that racial identities (different from the nation-state’s constructed tri-ethnic racial
blend) are validated in individual actors and within social and governmental
institutions.
Theoretically, Marx defined “ideology” as a system of ideas that generates
thoughts and experiences. Thoughts and experiences in turn are dependent on
the physical and symbolic environment in which individuals live. While Marx
refers most commonly to commodity production and social relations when
discussing ideology, I extend his theory to race relations; “race” is a creation of
historical relationships (ideologies), hegemonically constructed as social capital,
and extending into all aspects of everyday life (Marx and Engles 2001).
I argue that the historical ideology of Western European twentieth century
paradigms of scientific racism and nation building required Brazilians to accept
the premise of the biological supremacy of Western European whites. Brazilian
nationality rested on the acceptance that “in less than a hundred years Brazil
would have no Negroes whereas the U.S. would have the problem of twenty or
thirty million” (Winddance Twine 1998:7). Racism in Brazil is ironic,
convoluted, and secretive, generating a particularly difficult oxymoron that
combines scientific racism with racial miscegenation, while maintaining white
superiority. Authenticity through ethnicity has not yet been realized in Brazil.17
To create a counter-ideology capable of initiating a palpable challenge to

democracia racial might require a recognition of ethnic identities; an “unblending”
of Brazil’s ambiguously constructed racialized bodies (Nobles 1995).
As my data demonstrate, Brazilians are cognizant of racial categories
(phenotypes and skin-colors), while preferring to self-identify in the racially
ambiguous category of moreno/a. By self-identifying within Brazil’s racially
ambiguous moreno/a category, social actors employ the underlying bi-polarity of
democracia racial’s ideological constructs, and in so doing demonstrate the
depth and power of Brazil’s structural racial formations. The contradiction
between my participants’ awareness of racism in their lives, and their proclivity
to self-identify most frequently within the tri-racial category of Moreno/a might
be attributed to an intermediate state of consciousness, a slippery-slope where no
traction can be found, between shifting paradigms that define race in Brazil.
New challenges to existing discourses about race and racialized bodies are
expanding, and the term Afro-Brazilian is becoming a common referent for
darker-skinned African descendents in social science literature (Bailey 2009;
Caldwell 2007; Dávila 2006; Telles 2004; Twine 1998), suggesting that this topic
is no longer silenced and that the term itself has dialogic value. Indeed, the
intense debate around the implementation of the quota system for Brazilian
universities is another indication of the changing ideology of race in Brazil.
A good example of the potential for new paradigmatic ideological formations
can be found in a series of historic events that I identify as occurring during the
mid-1990s. These events paved the way for a major fracture in the status-quo of
the national discourse on race in Brazil:
• In 1995, President Henrique Cardoso began to prepare the way
for the dismantling of democracia racial, and in 2005, he declared
that racial discrimination against Afro-Brazilians does exist in
Brazil. Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to reject
publically and officially the myth of Brazil’s racial democracy.
• The second important event is the Third World Conference on
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Intolerance,
held in Durban, South Africa in 2001. The conference was well
attended by black movement Afro-Brazilian activists who exerted
considerable pressure on the media to pay attention to the issue of
racism in Brazil. By the summer of 2001, the Brazilian media
finally began to openly investigate racial discrimination in Brazil.
• The third important event occurred in the same year, 2001, when
establishing affirmative action plans for college entrance into
public universities was proposed. However, the constructions of
Brazilian racial identity posed a difficult question: How can one
establish programs to favor blacks when we cannot even
determine who is black? (dos Santos and Obianuju C. Anya
2006:30-31). This question continues to be the center of debate
about race, racism, and racial inequality in Brazil.
Embarking on a plan to define social benefits by “race,” seventeen Brazilian
universities used quotas in 2003. Instigated at the federal level, this decision has
been hotly debated in the popular media (Pimentel 2003; Vogt 2003; Figueredo
2008). However, even with the encouragement of the Federal Ministry of

Education, only 13.8 percent of new students have entered Brazil’s 56 federal
universities based on the quota system, and less than half of all the federal
universities have an affirmative action program in place (Folha de São Paulo
2006).
The Brazilian government must continue to expand and better implement
existing affirmative action and quota system based programs that focus on
economic and skin-color criteria for students applying to public and private
universities.18 Another important development should be the creation of new
funding sources, and expansion of existing accessible financial aid programs
with low interest rates and flex payment plans for economically poor students of
all ethnicities (most likely, the majority of these students would be of darker skin
color with Afro-Brazilian phenotypes or students of indigenous ethnicity).19
A cyclical process of engagement is necessary to carve out a new paradigm of
Brazilian identity, one that acknowledges ethnic differences, and rejects social
class as the epicenter and cause of racial and social inequalities. Debates in
public forums, on media outlets, and internet chat-rooms between everyday
mulatos, pardos, armarelos, indigenous ethnicities, Afro-Brazilians, and those
who self-identify as white can foment the expansion and dissemination of
information about experiences of racism, notions of racial identity, and
identification of racial practices. Politicians, state and federal bureaucrats,
financial CEOs and other elites cannot be in charge of leading Brazil into
discussions about race and inequality. NGOs, public and private foundations,
universities, academic researchers and applied anthropologists, and media
activists must continue with their involvement in developing campaigns that
support and raise awareness about the historical processes that formed racial
attitudes and beliefs that continue to support racism in Brazil. Dismantling
democracia racial will require deep and profound structural changes within
Brazilian society.
While some Brazilians consider the topic of race to be repugnant, it needs to
be openly discussed in the public domain of politics, educational systems, media
outlets, film industries, and within the chambers of Brazil’s federal and civil
courts. Breaking the silence of Brazil’s democracia racial will require
meaningful social and economic changes at structural levels within government,
institutional, and organizational entities that currently perpetuate racial
ideologies that reflect colonial treatments of targeted racialized bodies.
What can we learn about racism in the Americas? Brazil’s democracia racial
and the “one-drop-of-blood-rule” in the United States produced abhorrent
systems of racial oppression and human suffering. While some social science
scholars argue that the US is moving toward “color-blindness” in terms of “race,”
and that Brazil is reluctantly accepting university quota systems based on “race,”
it is clear that both racial systems must be understood in terms of their respective
socio-historical constructions (Bonilla-Silva 1999; 2010; Doane and BonillaSilva 2003; Telles 2004). Both used science to inform and construct political
economies of racialized practices that produced as yet unacknowledged
genocides on both continents.
Unless the “seamier” side of Brazil’s socio-historical constructions of “race”

is exposed, the insights to understand their own cultural inheritance and the
ability to reach for authentic equality will be lacking. Without understanding
culturally constructed ancestral behaviors from the social and biological sciences
and colonial political agendas about “race,” societal change toward equality will
remain elusive, as will the various acts of reconciliation necessary for healing.

ENDNOTES
1Since it was identified by research participants as an ethnic identity, the term Negro is
capitalized in this paper.
2In this article, race is considered a cultural construction; not a category that defines
physical differences between and across human variation.
3Democracia racial (racial democracy) is a term frequently used to describe race
relations in Brazil. Coined by Freyre in the 1930s, democracia racial formulated the
belief that Brazilian’s do not view each other through the lens of race. Hence, the term
denied that Brazilian’s harbor racial prejudice towards one another. Freyre argued that the
highly miscegenated tri-racial composition of Brazil’s population resulted a racial mixture
that equalized social and racial relations. See Skidmore’s Black into White (1974) for his
dated, but historical text on debunking the Brazilian notion of democracia racial.
4The term moleque refers to a young street child. Originally, the term was used to
describe a slave child. During slavery in Brazil, using this term for a white person was
extremely offensive since it was a term used only for young slaves (Mikulak 2002;
Mikulak 2007a: Mikulak 2007b). Today, this term has a variety of meanings, some of
which are no longer considered pejorative or demeaning, depending on the region in
Brazil, and the context in which it is used. Trombadinha refers to an individual, usually
of young age, who does not have resources for survival, lives on the street, and robs to
survive. The term pivete refers to a street child or poor child living on the streets who is
dangerous due to his circumstances. Such individuals are seen to be drug users, and to
display violent behaviors (Mikulak 2002; Stephens 1999).
5The term favela refers to communities of economically poor people (often darkerskinned
Afro Brazilians) living as squatters in shantytowns (slums) on the periphery of
small and large cities in Brazil; the term favelados refers to the population living in Brazil
shantytowns.
6Symbolic power is referred to in this article as cognitive maps, constructed by social
agents based on socio-historical and hegemonic norms (Boyer 1999).
7Ethnicity is understood here to refer to cultural expressions that identify difference
among marginalized and/or peripheral groups within a nation-state (Sanjek 1971).
8Other social scientists exploring race relations based on census data include Nobles’
(2000) work on the politics of race, censuses, and citizenship, Royal and Dunston’s
(2004) work on changing paradigms of race due to human genome research, and
Andrade’s (2003) research on quota systems in Brazilian.
9The meaning of terms to define people-of-color include: caboclos (mixture of white
and Indian), sertanejo (peasant from rural northeastern backlands), caipiras (peasant from
the rural southeast), and moleque (slave child, person without dignity) (de Holanda
Ferreira 1975; Stephens 1999). Each linguistic distinction reflects a symbolic
phenotypical appearance.
10The term “personalistic” refers to the doctrine of subjective realism which regards
personality, appearance, and social position as the means in which to interpret everyday
reality. Mainwaring (1988) provides the following assessment of personalism in Brazilian
politics: “One of the factors that has undermined party competition and helped sustain
elitist forms of domination in Brazil has been pervasive clientelism. Rather than providing
mass entitlements, politicians have generally attempted to win popular support by
providing personal favors. Competition is then reduced to personalistic rivalries among
those politicians who compete for votes in a given region; it has no programmatic basis.
Personal favors and clientelism exist in all political systems, but the extent to which they

undercut broad-based competition in Brazil is exceptional” (p. 98).
11While Brazil’s slavery has often been touted as less cruel and more benign than slavery
in the United States, when slaves were allowed to purchase their freedom and land, the
paternalistic relations of patron-client dependency remained in place through a variety of
social and institutional practices that include lack of access to quality education, medical
care, and social services (Skidmore 2003).
12For a discussion on polygenesis, monogeneses theories, social Darwinism, Lamarkian
evolution, and classical cultural evolutionism see Baker 1998; Jahoda 1999; Schwarcz
1999 and Service 1985.
13The term “minors” was a legal code used to categorize darker-skinned, economically
poor street youth, while the term “adolescent” was used to describe lighter-skinned,
middle and upper-class youth. Batteries of psychological exams were used to demonstrate
the degenerate capacities of minors, and to levy sentences that unjustly incarcerated street
youth (Rizzini 1994).
14However, Brazil is making progress in reducing extreme poverty: for example,
between 1990 and 2005, extreme poverty was reduced by 12%, and poverty was reduced
by 14% (World Bank 2007).
15Functional Illiteracy refers to less than 4 years of schooling.
16Brazilian educational systems are socially and historically linked to it its colonial
history. In Brazil, education began with the Jesuits in 1549, and remained in their hands
for 210 years. In 1759, the Jesuits were expelled from Portugal and her colonies, and
religious education was transferred from the church to the state. The educational system
remained stagnant until the beginning of the 19th century (McCoy 1959). See also
Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Education Finance in Brazil (Brown 2002) for a
discussion on the military regimes political clout with the private sector for educational
funding of public universities at the expense of public primary and secondary education.
17Warren offers an interesting discussion on the exception to Brazil’s tri-racial identity
based on the concept of democracia racial. Ironically, according to his research it was the
military dictatorship that changed Brazil’s policies regarding Indian exorcism (Warren
2001:54-92).
18See Bailey’s Legacies of Race: Identities, Attitudes, and Politics in Brazil, particularly
chapter 8 on racial sorting for an excellent discussion of the polemics of affirmative action
and quota systems (Bailey 2009).
19Other programs such as the Bolsa Familia (a health and school scholarship program
for primary and secondary school children), has had some success in impacting poverty
stricken families and their children. The program was fully initiated in 2003, and requires
children between the ages of 7 – 15 to remain in school and to participate in social
educational activities throughout the entire day. In exchange for complying with the rules
of the program, families of participating children receive a specified monthly income
(Ozanira da Silva e Silva 2007).
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